Journal of Islamic Awakening Studies

Abstract Toofan Al-Aqsa Operation " al - aqsa storm " as one of the prominent examples of contemporary asymmetric conflicts, presents new dimensions regarding the legitimacy of the use of force in international law and Islamic jurisprudence. This article, employing a descriptive-analytical approach and a comparative method, examines the legitimacy of this operation within the framework of "self-defense" in public international law and "defensive jihad" in Islamic political jurisprudence. The central research question is whether Toofan Al-Aqsa Operation, considering the ongoing occupation and aggression, meets the criteria for self-defense stipulated in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. The research findings indicate that, given the continuation of armed attack, the violation of the right to self-determination, and the absence of effective non-violent solutions, invoking self-defense in this case is arguable in terms of the criteria of necessity and proportionality. Additionally, an examination of the jurisprudential foundations governing defensive jihad—such as the prohibition of oppression, the defense of Islamic territory, and the protection of the oppressed—demonstrates that armed resistance against sustained occupation is considered legitimate within the framework of Islamic jurisprudence. So Toofan Al-Aqsa Operation can be analyzed as a case of interaction and overlap between the rules of international law and the jurisprudence of defensive jihad in the context of asymmetric warfare.

Abstract This study seeks to re-examine the trajectory of Islamic radicalism in Afghanistan through an analytical exploration of the ideological and political confrontation between two dominant currents: the traditionalist right-wing radicalism embodied by the Taliban and the left-leaning Islamist revolutionary movements commonly identified as the Mujahideen. While both currents emerged within the broader socio-political upheavals intensified during the Cold War, they represented divergent interpretations of political Islam, state formation, and the relationship between religion and modern governance. The Mujahideen initially mobilized in resistance to the Soviet-backed regime of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, combined Islamist discourse with revolutionary and, in some factions, quasi-leftist organizational structures, reflecting both indigenous reformist impulses and the strategic patronage of external actors such as the United States and Pakistan. In contrast, the Taliban articulated a more rigid, traditionalist, and jurisprudentially conservative project that prioritized the imposition of a centralized Islamic order grounded in a strict interpretation of Sharia. The confrontation between these two radical paradigms was not merely military but epistemological and structural, encompassing competing visions of legitimacy, authority, and social order. By situating this conflict within the interplay of domestic fragmentation and international geopolitical competition, the present study argues that the Afghan experience of Islamic radicalism must be understood as a dynamic and internally contested phenomenon rather than a monolithic ideological project.